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ESTATE TAXATION - MARITAL DEDUCTION -
SPECIFIC DOLLAR AMOUNT
Northeastern Pa. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States,
363 F.2d 476 (3d Cir. 1966).
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 establishes an estate tax,
the amount of which varies with the size of the taxable estate.1
The 1954 Code is the amended product of the 1939 provisions
which taxed the gross estate and allowed few deductions.2 This
approach was severely criticized on the basis that it gave undue
benefits to citizens of community property states since it taxed only
one half the community estate upon the death of one of the marital
partners.3 Successive changes were made,4 and the 1954 Code fi-
nally allowed the deduction of any specified portion of a trust
comprising up to one half the estate.5 Under this method up to
one half of the decedent's estate can be placed in trust for -the sur-
viving spouse, the proceeds being paid at fixed intervals.6
Interpretation by both the courts and the Treasury Department
was strict: the courts denied deductions to any estate in which the
surviving spouse's interest was not absolute either in income or
corpus,8 while the Treasury Department held that the 1954 provi-
sions applied to only that portion of the trust which was repre-
sentative of a fractional or percentile share of the estate, expressly
excluding a specified payment from a non-delineated trust corpus.'
I INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2001 [hereinafter cited as CODE]. The taxable estate
is an aggregate figure determined from the decedent's holdings at the time of his
death less allowable deductions. CODE § 2052; Treas. Reg. § 20.2051-1 (1958) [here-
inafter cited as Reg.]. The deductions include "exemptions" as well as "deductions"
for expenses, indebtedness, and taxes; losses; charitable deductions; and the marital de-
duction. CODE §§ 2052-56; Reg. §§ 20.2052-1, 20.2053-1 to -10, 20.2054-1,
20.2055-1.
2 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 812, 53 Star. 123.
3 S. REP. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1948).
4 Revenue Act of 1942, § 402(b) (1) (e) (2), 56 Star. 942, repealed by Revenue
Act of 1948, ch. 168, § 351(a), 62 Star. 116.
5 Code 5 2056(b)(5).
6See H.R. REP. No. 1274, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1948). See generally Reilly
v. Commissioner, 239 F.2d 797 (3d Cir. 1957).
7 Cf. Starrett v. Commissioner, 223 F.2d 163 (1st Cir. 1955); Estate of Shedd, 23
T.C. 41, 46 (1954), affd, 237 F.2d 345, 359 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
1024 (1957); Estate of Tingley, 22 T.C. 402 (1954).
8 Estate of Hoffenberg, 22 T.C. 1185 (1954), aff'd per curiam, 223 F.2d 470 (2d
Cir. 1955).
9 Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(a) states that to comply with the Code, all of the five fol-
lowing conditions must be met:
(1) The surviving spouse must be entitled for life to all of the income
MARITAL DEDUCTION
Two recent United States Court of Appeals decisions have dealt
with the question of what is a "specific portion" of the estate for
tax purposes. In each case the spouse was left a fixed monthly
payment from a trust account. In each case the spouse had the
right and power to pass the remainder of the trust by her last will
and testament. The trustees in Northeastern Pa. Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co. v. United States"0 claimed one half the decedent's estate
as being eligible for the marital deduction." However, the Trea-
sury Department disallowed the deduction on the ground that no
specific portion of the trust was identified, defining "specific por-
tion" as a fractional or percentile part of the entire estate.'" The
trustees paid the tax under protest and sued for a refund of one
half the tax. The district court found in favor of the trustees'3
but did not allow a deduction of the entire one half of the estate.
An actuarial method was used to determine the present total value
of the monthly stipend.'4
On appeal by the government, 5 the Third Circuit ruled that
the actuarial formula "does not, in our view, isolate that part of
the trust corpus from which the surviving spouse is entitled to all
the income."'" In reaching this decision, the court distinguished
from the entire interest or a specific portion of the entire interest, or to a
specific portion of all the income from the entire interest.
(2) The income payable to the surviving spouse must be payable an-
nually or at more frequent intervals.
(3) The surviving spouse must have the power to appoint the entire
interest or the specific portion to either herself or her estate.
(4) The power in the surviving spouse must be exercisable by her alone
and (whether exercisable by will or during life) must be exercisable in all
events.
(5) The entire interest or the specific portion must not be subject to a
power in any other person to appoint any part to any person other than the
surviving spouse.
10 363 F.2d 476 (3d Cir. 1966).
11 CODE §§ 2056(b)5-(c)1.
12Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(c) (1961).
IsNortheastern Pa. Natl Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 235 F. Supp. 941
(M.D. Pa. 1964), rev'd, 363 F.2d 476 (3d Cir. 1966).
1- Actuarial accountancy is a procedure for computing the value of various factors
in the monthly stipend over the projected life span; the life expectancy is determined
by an aggregation of statistical life expectancy over a broadly based population. See
Reg. 5 20.2037-7. There is also included a factor representing the accrual of invest-
ment over the period of life expectancy. Since this method gives the life expectancy
on an objective, non-selective basis, the Treasury Department, which uses these tables
extensively, has issued a ruling that individual health factors may be included in the
determination of individual life expectancy. Rev. Rule 66-307, 1966 INT. REv. BULL.
No. 42, at 74.
5 Northeastern Pa. Nael Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 363 F.2d 476 (3d
Cir. 1966).
161d. at 481.
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the earlier case of Gelb v. Commissioner,17 in which the primary
issue was the power of appointment over the remainder, the actu-
arial method being used to determine that portion of the trust being
entitled to the marital deduction. The Northeastern court noted
that here there were not the "factual constants" found in Gelb,
where the surviving spouse had the income from the trust corpus
for life."8 Furthermore, the court noted that its decision was con-
trary to the holding of the Seventh Circuit in a similar case. 9
That case, Citizens Natl Bank v. United States,"0 dealt with a
similar factual situation. The trustees claimed that an actuarial
calculation could determine the "specific portion" of the trust eligi-
ble for the marital deduction. The district court had concluded
that the Treasury Regulation in question2' was inconsistent with
the statute "in so far as it would limit the statutory term 'specific
portion' to 'a fractional or percentile share."' 22  The Seventh Cir-
cuit held that the use of an actuarial formula was a valid means
by which the intent of Congress in enacting the provision could be
fulfilled,2" that the facts of the case were not sufficiently distin-
guishable from Gelb, and that therefore the Gelb doctrine should
be upheld. 2
4
The courts in Northeastern and Gelb agreed with the purpose
of the marital deduction as stated by Mr. Justice Goldberg in United
States v. Stapf:25
ITihe marital deduction permits a deceased spouse, subject to
certain requirements, to transfer free of taxes one-half of the non-
community property to the surviving spouse... [Tlhe primary
thrust of this is to extend to taxpayers in common-law States the
advantages of "estate splitting" otherwise available only in com-
munity property States. 8
The court in Northeastern felt that the "specific portion" as defined
in the Treasury Regulations27 could not be determined by the actu-
arial method and that the method employed included the factor of
17 298 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1962).
18 363 F.2d at 484.
1' Ibid.
20 359 F.2d 817 (7th Cir. 1966).
21 Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5 (c).
22 359 F.2d at 819.
2
3id. at 821.
24 Ibid.
25375 U.S. 118 (1963).
261d. at 128.
27Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5.
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fund dissolution,28 which had been "in no way ... contemplated
by the decedent."29
Moreover, relying on the principle that the value of the trust
was to be computed at the time of the decedenes death,8 ° the court
asserted that the use of a fixed rate of interest was "unreal"' as
the sum determined was not demonstrative of actual market condi-
tions. The actuarial system used the investment rate as a constant,
and the Northeastern court felt this alone guaranteed the failure to
determine a specific portion. The majority opinion specifically
noted the Seventh Circuit decision in Citizens Natl Bank, but no
attempt was made to justify the conflict between the circuits0tm
The court merely stated that "we have been unable to conceive of
a method to compute the 'specific portion' of the trust corpus."'84
The dissent in Northeastern argued that there was valid prece-
dent for the use of an actuarial method, since the intent of Congress
was remedial - to balance the inequitable position of the com-
munity property states vis-4-vis the common law states - the term
"specific portion" is to be interpreted liberally; thus, the dissent
concluded, "specific portion" was ascertainable "after a reasonable
calculation.28 5
Citizens Nat'l Bank8" was argued in substantially the same man-
ner as Northeastern. However, the former case rejected the gov-
ernment's argument that the portion determined by the actuarial
method was not a "fractional or percentile share" within the qualifi-
cations of the Code owing to the effect of economic fluctuation
on the portion of the trust corpus concerned.87 The majority ruled
that the method proposed by the trustees was proper and that the
2 8 The concept of "fund dissolution" is related to the actuarial formula because in
order to arrive at the prescribed monthly payment, the trust corpus must be so invaded
that it will be completely extinguished upon the death of the surviving spouse.
29 363 F.2d at 482.
80 Jackson v. United States, 376 U.S. 503, 508 (1964).
31363 F.2d at 482.
s2 Id. at 482-83. The court stated.
[A)n investment constant ... has no place in a problem where the very
real income variations turn the issue of the allowance of the marital deduc-
tion. Indeed, the use of such a constant is absent from the regulations dealing
with the "specific portion" issue, whereas it may be found in the regulations
in formulas geared to different problems.
33 Id. at 484.
34 Ibid.
35 Id. at 487.
36 Citizens Nat'l Bank v. United States, 359 F.2d 817 (7th Cir. 1966).
37 ld. at 820.
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intent of Congress should not be defeated by an unduly limited
interpretation of the terms. 8
In Gelb the government argued that "there is no certainty that
the value" of the entire corpus "will be the same on the date of
the surviving spouse's death as it was on the date of the decedent's
death." 9  The court realized that the surviving spouse would there-
fore not bear the risk of any change in market conditions, but this
was said to be the intent of Congress in enacting the statute. Be-
cause the language of the statute, speaking of a "specific portion"
rather than a "fractional or percentile share" demonstrated the in-
tent to differentiate the two terms, the contention of the Treasury
Department was held to be incorrect.4"
The variety and frequency of the actuarial method's use by the
Treasury Department and others4' does much to persuade one of
its validity as a means of computing the marital deduction. The
method is designed to spread the risks and variances over a suffi-
ciently wide base so that their effect is negligible. As was indicated
in Gelb, "the United States is in business with enough different tax-
payers so that the law of averages has ample opportunity to work."
If it is conceded that some form of computation is proper, the
question becomes which method best determines the specific por-
tion from the given dollar amount. In both cases a method first
suggested in Gelb was used.43 There the government argued that
the discount rate used in this calculation could not be determined
adequately since the rate would fluctuate with economic conditions,
38Id. at 821.
39 Gelb v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 544, 550 (2d Cir. 1962).
40 Ibid.
41 When the charitable deduction provision was added to the estate tax, Revenue
Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 403 (a) (3), 40 Stat. 1098, the actuarial method was almost uni-
versally accepted in determining the value of deductions. 298 F.2d at 551 n.7. The
method was used to compute the actual value of charitable gifts subject to life estates.
See Commissioner v. Sternberger, 348 U.S. 187, 190-92 (1955); Merchants Nat'l Bank
v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 256, 259 n.6 (1943). It was used where a life tenant had
died before the case came to court. Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 151
(1929).
In addition, the actuarial method has been used to determine the value of a re-
mainderman's estate where the vested remainderman had died before the life benefi-
ciary, William Korn, 35 B.T.A. 1071 (1937). The actuarial tables have also been used
to value gifts of remainder interests. Betty Durnaine, 16 T.C. 1035 (1951); Henry F.
Du Pont, 2 T.C. 246 (1943). And, the method has been used to value life estates and
annuities. F. J. Sensenbrenner, 46 B.T.A. 713 (1942).
42 298 F.2d at 552.
43Id. at 551. Northeastern Pa. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 363 F.2d
476, 484 n.17 (3d Cir. 1966); Citizens Nat'l Bank v. United States, 359 F.2d 817,
820 (7th Cit. 1966).
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and a slight change in the interest rate will greatly vary the cost,
that is, the basic fund needed to produce the desired income.44 In
effect, this would appreciate or depreciate the trust corpus. Since
the term "specific portion" must relate to some larger, fixed sum it
is possible that the sum would be greater than the permissible
amount, thus violating the specific limits of the statute. The issue
is whether this interpretation of the language comports with the
true intent of Congress.45 The Third Circuit in Northeastern would
accept the government's argument, one which apparently violates
the intent of Congress.4"
The better view is expressed by the Seventh Circuit in Citizens
Nat'l Bank. The actuarial method has admitted faults, but it does
permit a specific portion to be established from a fixed monthly
payment. The value of the estate would be determined at the time
of death, and both the government and the taxpayer would share
equally the chances of a quixotic economy. The fact that at some
point in time this computation must be established without the
constant worry of what might happen in the future has prompted
this statement: "We cannot wait, like 'Monday morning quarter-
backs,' to see what actually happened but must concern ourselves
with what could have happened."47  Use of the actuarial formula
is consistent with the language and intent of Congress as expressed
in the statute.4"
LARRY B. FAiGni
44 Stabert, Assumptions as to Actuarial Methods, 41 TAXES 11, 12 (1963).
45 359 F.2d at 820.
46 363 F.2d at 487.
4 7 Bookwalter v. lamar, 323 F.2d 664, 670 (8th Cir. 1963).
48 363 F.2d at 488.
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